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Condemnation Of Depleted Underground
Reservoirs For Gas Storage Areas
One of the most pressing problems facing the gas utilities today
is the inability to deliver sufficient quantities of gas to meet con-
sumer demands on winter days of peak operation. The supply in
the Southwest is plentiful, but because of the tremendous increase
in the amount of gas delivered annually to northern markets,
transmission and distribution headaches in the market area have
arisen."
Getting the gas to the point of consumption at the precise
time it is required by the public is the specific problem. When the
demand increases, the supply at the market is drawn upon to a
greater extent than it can be replenished. Pressure troubles de-
velop, and industrial plants and domestic users are asked to cur-
tail. The completion of the Gulf Interstate supply line in Novem-
ber, 1954, will help somewhat, but is by no means a solution to
the supply shortage.
Many utilities have found that the use of depleted underground
gas sands as storage reservoirs greatly increases the supply avail-
able in cold weather as the gas accumulated and stored during
the summer months can be easily injected into the supply lines
near the points of increased consumption.2 Wells which formerly
produced are natural containers for underground storage. When
left vacant, they can be refilled with gas simply by reversing the
producing procedure and pumping gas back into the earth.
Being migratory in nature, gas has no fixed situs but it does
constitute part of the land in which it tarries for the moment. The
owner of the land alone has the right to extract it, and he may
capture all or any part of the contents of a pool without violating
the rights of his neighbors, although his action diminishes the
common supply.3 It is evident that 100 per cent of the storage
rights on a contemplated tract, including the surrounding fringe
area, is necessary before any project may be undertaken. Gas dis-
tributors have been generally successful in leasing storage rights.
Most landowners welcome thd standard $200 per well annual pay-
ment, but a few hamper the success of an entire storage pool by
1 In Ohio alone the annual delivery since 1946 has doubled, while seven
times more homes use gas for heat than in pre-war years. Information Dept,
The Ohio Fuel Gas Co., Columbus, Ohio.
2 On Dec. 18, 1953, 55 per cent -593 million cubic feet - delivered by Ohio
Fuel, came from underground storage. Information Dept., The Ohio Fuel Gas
Co., Columbus, Ohio.
3 Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900); Kelley v. Ohio Oil Co., 57
Ohio St. 317, 49 N.E. 399 (1897).
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refusing to lease at any price. Thus, the interest of one or several
individual landowners seriously hampers adequate service to the
public.
The gas distributors, therefore, as public utilities, desire to
acquire the right to store gas underground in depleted reservoirs
by condemnation proceedings under the right of eminent domain.
The solution demands a look at condemnation proceedings in gen-
eral, existing statutes, and judicial interpretations.
The use of and justification for the power of eminent domain
are sufficiently well understood to allow the omission of any gen-
eral discussion of the subject at this point.4 However, the require-
ment that the power be used for the welfare of the public must
be borne in mind throughout 5 In general, it must be remembered
that the power lies dormant in the state until exercised, but that
the state of Ohio may delegate the power to subordinate agencies,
including private corporations. 6 When so delegated the statute
making the grant must be strictly followed and the public use
clearly evident.7 Note, however, that the power need not be ex-
pressly conferred if it appears in the statute by clear implication."
That the power is of practical value in serving the public is obvious
4
,Scott v. Toledo, 36 Fed. 385 (6th Cir. 1888); Kohl v. United States, 91
U.S. 397 (1875); Pontiac Improvement Co. v. Cleveland Metropolitan Park
District, 104 Ohio St. 447, 135 N.E. 635 (1922).
SWestern Union Telegraph Co. v. Louisville and Nashville Railway Co.,
270 Ill. 399, 110 N.E. 583 (1915).
6 By the Ordinance of 1787, the territorial government was limited in the
general right of eminent domain by the requirement that compensation should
be paid when public exigencies make the taking necessary, ORurnAscE or
1787, AjT. II. This was superseded by a similar provision in the Ohio Con-
stitution of 1802, OHio COxST., ART. VII, §4 (1802),- and the Constitution of
1851, OMo CONST., ART. I, §19; Omo CoNsr. ART. XII, §5, which added
limitations with respect to when compensation should be paid or secured
and how it should be assessed. Missouri v. Union Electric Light and Power
Co., 42 F. 2d 692 (N.D. Mo. 1930); Richland School v. Overmeyer, 164 Ind. 382,
73 N.E. 811 (1905).
7lHatch v. Cincinnati and Indiana Railroad Co., 18 Ohio St. 92 (1868);
Zanesvlle v. Zanesville Telegraph and Telephone Co., 64 Ohio St. 67 (1901);
Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439 (1930); Cincinnati v. Louisville and Nash-
ville Railroad Co., 88 Ohio St. 283, 102 N.E. 951 (1913); NicHoLs, Ermnmu
DomAw §3.213 (1950) "Even when the power has been expressly granted,
the grant, itself, and the extent thereof will be construed strictly against
the grantee. The latter will not be allowed to take the lands of another un-
less such right comes clearly and unmistakeniy within the limits of the
authority granted. Whatever is not plainly given is to be construed as
withheld." But see, Covington and Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Magruder, 66
Ohio St. 455, 475, 59 N.E. 216 (1900). "While the legislative grant should be
strictly construed, it should not be technically construed so as to defeat the
purpose of the grant."
8Oakland Club v. South Carolina Public Service Authority, 110 F. 2d
84 (4th Cir. 1940).
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from its delegation to such- varied agencies as bridge, cemetery,
canal, electric light and power, irrigation, loggery, railroad, tele-
phone and telegraph, water and pipeline companies.9
Unfortunately, as with so many legal phrases the term "public
use" has been given many definitions but no precise meaning. The
discussion of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Irrigation Co.
v. Klein is fairly typical.10 There it was said that the legislature
determines "when" the power of eminent domain may be ex-
ercised by private persons and corporations for public uses, and
the character, quality, method, and extent of such exercise; but
the courts determine "what is" a public use. It is understandable
why the decisions of the various states are irreconcilable. By the
weight of authority public use under the law of eminent domain
is not the equivalent of public benefit, public convenience, or public
welfare, but in order to make use a public one, there must be a
right on the part of the public, or some portion of it, or some
public or quasi public agency on behalf of the public, to use the
property after it has been condemned. 11 But the recent pronounce-
ment by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Ruh,12 indicates
that the phrase "for public use" found in Article I, Section 19 of
the Ohio Constitution is to mean the same as if it had read "for
the public welfare."
It is not the number of people who use the property taken
that determines whether the use is or is not a public one. A use
does not fail merely because immediate enjoyment of it is limited
to a small group or even to a single person.13 An appropriation
should not fail simply because it also promotes a private incidental
interest.14 The Supreme Court of California said that "in determin-
ing whether the taking of property is necessary for public use, not
9 See 29 C.J.S., Eminent Domain, §24. Equally important is the factor of
the property owner's right to a constitutional statute, Nichols v. Cleveland,
247 Fed. 731 (6th Cir. 1917), and a taking within the power granted, Pontiac
Improvement Co. v. Cleveland Metropolitan Park District, 104 Ohio St. 447,
135 NE. 635 (1922). While the requisite finding that the taking is necessary
is a legislative matter, Sears v. Akron, 246 U.S. 242 (1918), it may be dele-
gated to a private corporation, State v. Ferguson, 155 Ohio St 26, 97 N.E. 2d
660 (1951); Geisy v. Cincinnati, W. & Z. RI.. Co., 4 Ohio St. 308 (1854).
10 Lake Koen Navigation, Reservoir and Irrigation Co. v. Klein, 63
Kan. 484, 65 Pac. 684 (1901).
11 Shasta Power Co. v. Walker, 149 Fed. 568 (N.D. Cal. 1916); See note,
54 A.L.R. 7 (1928).
12 State ex 'el. v. Rich, 159 Ohio St 13, 25, 26, 110 N.E. 2d 778 (1953)
which limits paragraph three of the syllabus in Pontiac Improvement Co. v.
Cleveland Metropolitan Park District, 104 Ohio St. 447, 135 N.E. 635 (1922).
13 U.S. v. Boyle, 52 F. Supp. 906 (N.D. Ohio 1943), afirned in Cleveland
v. U.S., 323 U.S. 329 (1945).
14 State v. Rich, 159 Ohio St 13, 25, 26 110 NX.. 2d 778 (1953).
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only the present demands of the public, but those which may be
fairly anticipated in the future, may be considered."' 5 "Public uses
are not limited, in the modern view, to matters of mere business
necessity and ordinary convenience, but may extend to matters
of public health, recreation and enjoyment."' 6 The Minnesota
court has stated: "No question is made of the right... to condemn
property for boulevards, pleasure drives, etc .... and numerous
other purposes which contribute to the general good and well-
being of the community."' 7 If the courts were to supply such views
in condemning for the right to store gas underground, it seems as
though the gas utilities would have no trouble in showing that
the use of storage would be a public one. No one would deny that
supplying cities and homes with gas is not a service to the public,
which the public has a right to demand. In times like the present,
when the supply of gas is so inadequate that many consumers
desiring gas for heat are not permitted its use, it seems that any
facility which is reasonably required to make possible adequate
service would be a public use by being for the public welfare.
It is apparent from the conditions of the Ohio gas utilities on days
of peak operation, that the need of an adequate storage supply near
the point of consumption, is indeed pressing. Evidence of this is
abundant.'8
OHIO STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The courts have not been hesitant to subject private business
to public regulation when the business is devoted to public use
to such an extent as to create a peculiarly close relationship be-
tween the business and the public.' 9 An obligation is said to be
raised on the business' part to be reasonable in dealing with the
public.20 The obligation of these "public utilities" is that of service
to, or readiness to serve, an indefinite public (or portion of the
public) which has a legal right to demand and receive the services
and commodities.21
Ohio, by statute, has recognized artificial and natural gas
Is Central Pacific Railway Co. v. Feldman, 152 Cal. 303, 309, 92 Pac. 849
(1907).
16 Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923); See,
infra, note 73.
17 State ex rel. Twin City Building and Investment Co. v. Houghton, 144
Minim. 1, 174 N.W. 885, 887.
18 See, supra, note 17.
19 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876); Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of In-
dustrial Relations of Kansas, 262 U.S. 522 (1922).
20 Munn v. Ilinois, supra, note 19.
21 Southern Ohio Power Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 110 Ohio St.
246, 143 N.E. 700 (1924).
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suppliers, and pipeline companies as public utilities.22 Natural gas
suppliers, being public utilities, are subject to the utility acts.28
Note that under OnIo REv. CODE § 4905.03 the term "gas company"
refers to suppliers of artificial gas; "natural gas company" to sup-
pliers of natural gas; and "pipeline company" to transporters of
natural gas. The right to condemn for underground storage is de-
sired by the suppliers falling within the "natural gas company"
category. No such power is needed by the dealers of bottled gas
or the transporters, whose function is one of carriage only.
That pipeline companies have the power of eminent domain
in acquisition of rights of way cannot be doubted.24 Many gas dis-
tributing companies (suppliers) have also been vested with this
power.25 As seen in Columbus v. Federal Gas and Fuel Co., 26 pipe-
line companies and distributors have exercised eminent domain in
acquisition of rights of way and facilities necessary for operations
of transporting and distributing gas. This power stems from Onto
REV. CODE § 1723.01 establishing the power to enter upon and ap-
propriate land.27
22 Olro REV. CODE §4905.02, "As used in sections 4905.01 to 4905.64 in-
clusive, of the Revised Code, public utility includes every corporation, com-
pany, co-partnership, person, or association, their lessees, trustees, or re-
ceivers, defined in section 4905.03 of the Revised Code ..." Omo REv. CODE
§4903.03. "Any person, firm, co-partnership, voluntary association, joint-
stock association, company, or corporation, wherever organized or incorporated,
is: (5) A gas c6mpany, when engaged in the business of supplying arti-
ficial gas for lighting, power, or heating purposes to consumers within this
state or when engaged in the business of supplying gas to gas companies or to
natural gas companies within this state, but a producer engaged in supply-
ing to one or more gas or natural gas companies, only such artificial gas as
is manufactured by such producer as a by-product of some other process in
which such producer is primarily engaged within this state is not thereby a
gas company ....
(6) A natural gas company, when engaged in the business of supplying
natural gas for lighting, power or heating purposes to consumers within
this state or when engaged in the business of supplying natural gas to gas
companies or to natural gas companies within this state, but where a pro-
ducer supplies to one or more gas or natural gas companies only such gas
as is produced by such producer from wells drilled on land owned in fee by
such producer or where the principal use of such land by said producer is
other than the production of gas, within this state, such producer is not thereby
a natural gas company...
(7) A pipeline company, when engaged in the business of transporting na-
tural gas, oil or coal or its derivatives through pipes or tubing, either wholly or
partly within this state ..."
23 OHO RLv. CODE §4905.63.
24 Carnegie Natural Gas Co. v. Swiger, 72 W.Va. 557, 79 S.E. 3 (1913).
2S Rushville v. Rushville Natural Gas Co., 132 Ind. 575, 28 N.E. 853 (1891).
26 Columbus v. Federal Gas and Fuel Co., 13 Ohio N-P. (N.S.) 394 (1910).
27 Omo REv. CoDE §1723.01. "If a company is organized for the purpose
of ... transporting natural oil artificial, gas ... through ... pipes .. ; for
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The statute establishes that the appropriation referred to in
Section 1723.01 shall be made in accordance with the law provid-
ing for compensation to the owners of private property appropri-
ated to the use of corporations. 28 The companies within this section
also may transport, store, insure, and ship natural gas, and for
such purposes may lay down, construct, and maintain the neces-
sary pipes.29 Such companies with respect to transporting natural
gas, are common carriers and subject to the duties and liabilities
of a common carrier.3 It must be remembered that before a corpo-
ration may appropriate private property, it must be unable to agree
with the owner as to compensation to be paid, or the easement or
interest sought to be appropriated. 31
So in Ohio the legislature has provided that natural gas com-
panies can appropriate property when engaged in storing, trans-
porting, or transmitting activities. 32 The substance of the present
statute is more fully appreciated when the historical development
is traced.
The first act relating to condemnation by fuel transportation
companies was passed in 1868, and provided for the incorporation
of oil transportation companies, with the "power to take and hold
such real and personal estate ... as may be necessary to trans-
port oils through tubes and pipes." The company was a "body
corporate" with the accompanying privileges and immunities, and
was "authorized to enter upon any land for the purpose of ex-
amining and surveying a line for its tubing and pipes for the trans-
porting of oil and may appropriate so much thereof as may be
deemed necessary for the laying down of such tubing and piping
... but no appropriation of private property shall be had... until
full compensation shall be made."33 Much of this language has
been carried over to Section 1732.01.34 The 1872 amendment re-
quired that the appropriation be made in accordance with the acts-
storing, transporting, or transmitting . .. , natural or artificial gas, ...
then such company may enter upon any private land to examine or survey
lines for its... pipes,. . or to examine and survey for a reservoir,... and
may appropriate so much of such, or any right or interest therein, as is
deemed necessary for the laying down or building of such... pipes, .. . res-
ervoirs, . . . storage yards .... receiving and delivery structures or fa-
cilities, pumping stations, and any other buildings, structures, appliances,
or facilities necessary to the purposes of such companies ......
2 8 OHIo Rv. CODE §1723.02.
29 OMo REv. CODE §1723.05.
30 OHio REv. CODE §1723.08.
3' OHIo REv. CODE §2709.03.
32 Note 27, supra.
33 65 Onto LAws 109 (1868).
34 Note 27, supra.
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then in force concerning compensation to owners of private prop-
erty.2
The right to transport and store water and maintain pipes as
necessary for petroleum transportation and the rights and privileges
by which Ohio railroad companies are governed on rights of entry
and rights of way, was provided by the act of 1875.36 The signifi-
cant provision of § 1723.01 applying to the gas companies found
its beginning in 1888 when the right of eminent domain was ex-
tended to a company organized for the purpose of transporting
natural gas. This grant included the surveying and laying of a
line, and the erection of buildings.3 7 In the amendment in 1900 the
right was extended to include companies organized for the pur-
pose of storing natural gas, petroleum, and water.38 Four years
later such things as building dams and canals, and erecting poles
to transmit electricity were in the scope of the provision.39
Artificial gas companies were provided for in 1927 and thus
had the right of storing, transporting, and transmitting.40 The 1951
amendment brought coal or its derivatives within the coverage of
appropriation, which proceeding now will be used to acquire "so
much of such land or any right or interest therein. '41 The revision
of the code in 1953 incorporated this existing statute, Or-o GEN.
CODE §10128 into OHIo REV. CODE § 1723.01, with only minor
changes in wording.
As is true in Ohio and all the other states except Kansas, the
scope of such similar statutes has never been judicially determined
in regard to underground storage in depleted reservoirs. The ex-
tension of the eminent domain power to include condemnation
of a lateral underground pool is a relatively new idea.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION AND LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS
IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS ON UNDERGROUND STORAGE
Consideration of the lone decision on underground gas storage,
Strain v. Cities Service Gas Co.,42 would prove helpful in dis-
tinguishing it from any case that may arise under the Ohio
statutes.
This was an action by landowners against the gas company
to restrain the taking or appropriation of their land under con-
demonation proceedings. Judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed
35 69 Omo LAWS 194 (1872).
36 72 OHio LAWS 151 (1874).
37 85 OaIo LAWS 115 (1888).
33 94 OmIo LAWs 382 (1900).
3997 OmIo LAws 300 (1904).
40112 OHio LAws 143 (1927).
41124 Oio LAWS 166 (1951).
42 Strain v. Cities Service Gas Co., 148 Kan. 393, 83 P. 2d 124 (1938).
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by the Supreme Court of Kansas and the condemnation proceeding
was enjoined, with Justice Allen writing both the majority and
dissenting opinions. Defendant was a gas pipeline and service
company, furnishing gas to numerous public utilities and federal
and state institutions. Defendant's petition for condemnation al-
leged that because of sudden and drastic temperature changes it
was necessary in order to maintain continuous, dependable and
uniform service to its customers, to have storage reservoirs to hold
gas in readiness for delivery; that the storage reservoirs would
obviate the danger to the gas consumers that would result from
an interruption of the gas supply. Defendant further alleged that
to accomplish this end it had three such reservoirs already in
operation, that it obtained all leases necessary for the use of the
depleted sands except the lease belonging to the landowners in the
action, and that they refused to lease except at exorbitant prices.
Limitations on the power of appropriation are provided in the
Kansas Constitution.43 The statute outlining the procedure for con-
demnation by a corporation having the right of eminent domain
contains no grant authorizing the defendant to take subterranean
sands of landowners for a gas storage reservoir.44 But the statute
did provide that "lands may be appropriated for the use of... oil
companies, pipeline companies, and for the piping of gas in the
same manner as is provided in this article for railway corporations
as far as applicable," and, any oil company, pipeline company or
gas company desiring the right to conduct oil in pipes or to con-
duct gas in pipes, may obtain such right of way for all necessary
pipes "in manner as aforesaid. '45
The statutory authorization for railway corporations to con-
demn, provides for the taking of a strip of land one hundred feet
wide for its right of way "and also such land as may be deemed
necessary for sidetracks, depots, workshops, and water stations,
materials for construction, except timber,...,46
The majority in holding that the above statutes did not author-
ize a pipeline company to condemn the underground strata, stated
that:
"The use of the earth as a storage place for gas is an idea
so novel, we cannot believe the legislature had such matter
in contemplation when the power of eminent domain was
given to pipeline companies .... To stretch the statute to
cover the case here presented would be little short of judi-
cial legislation.147
43 KAN. CONST., ART. XII, §4.
44KA. GEN. STAT. §26-10L 26-102 (1935).
45 KAN. GEN. STAT. §17-618 (1935).
46 Km. GEa. STAT. §66-901 (1935).
47 Strain v. Cities Service Gas Co., supra, note 42 at p. 395.
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It was also felt by the majority that if the statutes were in-
terpreted as giving the right to condemn any property necessary,
or which the gas companies deem necessary in the conduct of their
business, it would authorize them to condemn any land in which
its officials thought gas might be found if more than the amount
of gas available was thought necessary to supply its demands, and
that this would disrupt the whole theory of gas ownership, pro-
duction, and distribution. But the dissent doubted this and pointed
out that the majority's reasoning overlooked the protection given
the public by the settled law of eminent domain that the purpose
might be "public," and that there can be no taking for private use.
The dissent reasoned, it is submitted, and correctly so, that
the railway statute was to be applied to pipeline companies "as
far as applicable" meaning that they might take land for purposes
similar to the purposes allowed railway corporations. The dissent
stated:
"It would then seem that sites for compressor stations,
pipe yards and warehouses, storage reservoirs and expan-
sion chambers, etc., are as necessary to a gas utility as
sites for depots, workshops, and switch yards are to a
railroad company. The storage reservoir is not different in
kind but only in degree from the pipe that holds the
gas.,
4 s
Justice Wedell, concurring specially, believed that storage of
gas was designed to conserve it for future use, and that the legis-
lature in providing means of transporting it, was concerned with
consumption, a present use. He added that the duty to recognize
the need for underground storage rested with the lawmakers, that
it was the legislature's prerogative to provide the companies with
power to condemn for storage, and not the judiciary's.
As an article in the OKLAHo1A BAR AssociATioN JouMAL
pointed out, the conservative result reached in the Strain case,
which contrasts sharply with the realities facing today's gas in-
dustry, should not be controlling, for that decision was based solely
upon the construction of the Kansas statutes.49 In 1951 Kansas
granted the right of eminent domain for the underground storage.50
The utility desiring the power must get a certificate from the state
corporation commission which decides after a public hearing that
the strata sought is a suitable one and that its use for such pur-
poses is in the public interest. The certificate must also state the
amount of recoverable oil and native gas remaining in the reser-
voir. The utility may appropriate what the commission authorizes.
Section 2 provides that the public interest and welfare of the state
48 Strain v. Cities Service Gas Co., supra, note 42 at p. 399.
49 0x& BAR Assit. J. 1186, 1193 (1949).
SO KAx. GEN. STAT., Chap. 55-1201.
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is promoted if the storage "promotes conservation" of natural gas,
"permits the building of reserves for orderly withdrawal in periods
of peak demand, and makes more readily available... natural
gas resources to the domestic, commerical and industrial con-
sumers of the state."
The Oklahoma statute of 1951 is very similar to the Kansas
one regarding the certificate, commission and appropriation, but
it adds limitations that protect the interests of both landowner
and utility by defining their rights and obligations. 51
The Illinois provision (1951) likewise establishes application
procedures, notice and hearing, appeals and administration by the
Illinois Commerce Commission,52 which may issue no order ap-
proving the storage process if it involves condemnation of a stra-
tum or formation containing oil, gas or coal in commercial paying
quantities. The corporation must carry public liability insurance
in an amount determined by the Commission, to secure payment
of any damages resulting from the storage operation.
The Commissioner of the Department of Conservation and
Economic Development issues a permit under the New Jersey en-
actment53 (1951) and prescribes rules and regulations to effectu-
ate the storage operation. Michigan, the first state having a specific
storage condemnation statute (1947), set us a plan with the ap-
propriation power limited to "dry" natural gas leaseholds and the
right to be exercised when the company has obtained "by any
means other than by condemnation, at least 90 per cent... of the
property rights and interests in the underground field...,,54 Ken-
tucky in 1948 recognized condemnation for underground storage
fields55 and the following year West Virginia enacted a statute s6
setting up public uses for which property may be taken, but limited
to areas that ceased to produce or proved to be non-productive of
oil and gas in "substantial" quantities. The statutes of Texas, a
51 OKLA. STAT., Title 52, 36-1-36-7, "no sand or stratum capable of oil
production in paying quantities, through any known recovery method, shall
be subject to appropriation, nor shall any gas bearing sand or stratum, unless
the volume of native gas shall be shown to be substantially depleted." Sec-
tion 6 states that, "all natural gas which has previously been reduced to
possession, and which is subsequently injected into underground . . . res-
)ervoirs . . . , shall . . . be deemed the property of the injector . . . ,
and in no event shall such gas be subject to the right of the owner
of the surface of said lands or of any mineral interest therein, . . . pro-
vided that the injector . . . shall have no right to gas in any stratum ...
which has not been condemned . . . or otherwise purchased."
52 ILL. STAT., c. 104, §104-112.
53 NJ. STAT., 58:10, 35.1-35.4.
54M CMH. STAT., §11872, Sec. 2.
55 Ky. PRy. STAT., §278.501.
56 W. VA. CODE §5362.
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major gas producer are broad in coverage5 7 and similar to the Ohio
statutes. As seen, the states vary in the procedures for obtaining
permits, the limitations imposed, and the administration of the
enactments.
The gas industry in Ohio attempted to obtain the power by
statute as it sponsored a measure for consideration at the regular
session of the 100th General Assembly, which convened January
5, 1953. The act, Senate Bill No. 116, would have amended OHio
REV. CODE § 1723.01 to provide for the appropriation of interests in
land for the purpose of storing natural or artificial gas in under-
ground storage reservoirs. After further amendments in both Sen-
ate and House, the proposal,58 which eventually failed, provided
that Omio REv. CODE §1723.01 would remain in its present form,
with certain additions needed to extend the appropriation to cover
underground storage and with six additional clauses of limitation
for the companies benefiting from such condemnation powers S9
57 TEx. REv. Civ. SrAT., Art. 1496, "Such corporation shall have power
. . . to lay down, construct, maintain, and operate pipelines, tubes, tanks,
pump stations, connections, fixtures, storage houses and such machinery,
apparatus, devices and arrangements as may be necessary to operate such
pipes and pipelines." And "to own, hold, use and occupy such lands, right of
way, easements, franchises, buildingS, structures as may be necessary to
the purposes of such corporation." The right to condemn is provided by Art.
1497.
53 Amended .Senate Bill No. 116, Messrs. Ferguson-Kinley, 100th Gen-
eral Assembly, State of Ohio.
59 Clauses of limitations, Amended Senate Bill No. 116: (1) "The right
to so appropriate shall be limited to a stratum which is or previously has been,
commercially productive of natural gas, and to a stratum in which the original
native gas reserve is at least fifty percent depleted..."
(2) A corporation . . . shall at such time hold title in fee or have the
right by grant, lease, or other agreement, to store gas in at least seventy-five
per cent of the total acreage within the perimeter of the gas storage reservoir;
(3) A corporation.. . shall designate .. . the particular stratum in which it
will store gas. The area, location, extent, and depth of the reservoir, . . .
the location of any well or wells to be drilled, . . . together with the location
and extent of any pipeline or lines . . . , shall be accurately set out in its
petitions;
(4) The right to appropriate . . . shall not authorize the drilling of wells
... within (three thousand linear feet of any mine) ... other than on a strip-
ping or open pit operation, .... nor the appropriation of any coal seam other than
the right to drill... through such seam to a lower strata, nor the appropria-
tion of any other or greater occupation or use of the surface . . . than is
specifically set forth in the petition, nor any other interference with . . .
farming or for the recovery of any mineral or natural resource, or for any
other purpose;
(5) The right appropriated shall not be construed to preclude the owner of a
non-storage strata from drilling wells . . . from any stratum over or under
the stratum appropriated . . . , but said owner shall be liable for loss
of stored gas or damage to the storage reservoir as a result of such drilling;
(6)Nothing in this section shall be construed to relieve persons drilling wells
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The right to enter and survey would have extended to ascertain
the number of areas "necessary for the operation of an underground
reservoir for the storage of natural or artificial gas," and the com-
panies could have appropriated so much of such land, or any right
or interest therein, as was deemed necessary "for the storage of
natural or artificial gas in underground storage reservoirs including
the right to drill wells and construct and operate facilities for such
storage and the removal of such gas from such reservoirs,.... sub-
ject to the following limitations," which have been set out above.
This bill passed in the Senate with comparative ease by a 25
to 7 vote, but by the time the House Committee on Mines held
hearings in early July, the coal industry was organized in solid
opposition. As a result the bill was amended so that its benefit
to the gas utilities became practically a nullity. The committee sent
the bill to the House floor, but with an amendment that prohibited
using the land for the condemned purpose.60
In the end, the gas suppliers were not too sure that they even fa-
vored the proposed bill or would be able to operate under it any
better than without the right. The matter never came to a final
floor showdown as the majority party allowed it to die in the con-
fusion of the session's end realizing that the issue was too highly
controversial.
The practical effect of any attempt to secure favorable legis-
lation has at least brought the problem before the public, so that
if a future effort in the General Assembly be made, the idea will
not appear to be such a revolutionary one. Perhaps the coal and
gas industries should iron out their difficulties beforehand and pre-
sent a measure satisfactory to both.
PRESENT SiTuATIOx OF OHIo GAS SUPi'Lrs
The Ohio gas suppliers may not be operating in the precarious
situation that appears at first blush, for the existing Ohio statutes
appear broader than those under which the decision of the Strain
case was rendered.6' If this is true, an interpretation by the Su-
preme Court would give the desired use of depleted reservoirs for
storage, but without imposition of the limitations on operations that
were included in Senate Bill No. 116. The gas utilities might
well be benefited more by this judicial construing of existing stat-
utes than by the legislative enactment of new ones.
... or removing such stored gas from any of the requirements of any other
section of the Revised Code.60 Amendment by the House Committee on Mines "that no pipelines,
Troads, wells, buildings, or any other installations shall be placed by a gas
company upon an owner's lands under whose land a special stratum has
been acquired by right of eminent domain, against the owner's express wishes."
61 Omro R v. CODE §§4905.01 to 4905.63, 1723.01, 1723.02, 1723.05, 1723.03,
2709.01 to 2709.46.
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It is conceded that the legislature did not have the specific
thought of using depleted underground reservoirs for storage areas
when it enacted OaIo GEN. CODE §10128, the forerunner of Oino
REv. CODE §1723.01.62 However, the Ohio court has indicated a quite
possible argument.63 Thus, the absence of a specific statement on
underground storage should be no basis for defeating such use if in
fact the statute is sufficiently broad enough to include it, as the
Ohio statute appears to be.
A look at the 1951 decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio in
The Ohio Power Co. v. Deist,64 further strengthens the position
that gas suppliers as public utilities have the right to appropriate
private land for use as an underground storage reservoir. Here,
the Ohio Power Co., as plaintiff sought to appropriate a right of
way over defendant landowner's premises for the erection, opera-
tion, and maintenance of a belt conveyor to transport coal from
the company's privately owned coal field to its proposed electric
generating station, a distance of approximately four miles. The ap-
propriation statute for electric companies is very similar to the
one for gas companies.65S
In determining the scope and meaning of the phrase "and
other necessary structures and appliances" the court adopted the
thought expressed in an earlier decision 6 that while statutes dele-
gating the authority to exercise the right of eminent domain must
be strictly construed, such construction should not be so strict and
strained, as to disregard the admitted policy of the law. The court
stated:
"In construing the statute we cannot ignore changes and
improvements in mechanical devices which are incident to
and part of the general progress of science. We must rec-
62 See note 45, supra, for text of statute.
63 "But it is well understood that the scope of the operation or applica-
bility of a statute is not limited or prescribed by the object or purpose prompt-
ing its enactment. A statute may include by inference a case not originally
contemplated, when it deals with a genus, and a thing which afterward comes
into existence is a species thereof, and the language of the statute will
generally be extended to the new species, although it was not known and
could not have been contemplated by the Legislature when the act was
passed." Columbus v. Federal Gas and Fuel Co., supra, at p. 397.
64 The Ohio Power Co. v. Deist, 154 Ohio St. 473, 96 N.E. 2d 771 (1951).
65 Orro GEw. CODE §9192-1, now Omo Rsv. CoDE §4933.15, "Any com-
pany organized for the purpose of manufacturing, generating, selling, supply-
ing or transmitting electricity, for public and private use, may enter upon
any land, ... and may appropriate so much thereof, or any right or interest
therein, . . . as is deemed necessary for the erection, operation or main-
tenance of an electric plant, including its generating stations, substations,
switching stations, transmission and distribution lines, poles, towers, piers, con-
duits, cables, wires and other necessary structures and appliances." (Italics
supplied.)
66 Toledo and Wabash Railway Co. v. Daniels, 16 Ohio St. 390 (1865).
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ognize the fact that a modern electric generating plant
may and probably will embody many mechanical devices
which were non-existent in earlier years, and that many
such devices may form necessary integral parts of a mod-
ern electrical generating plant although not specifically
enumerated in the statute under discussion.
A belt conveyor for transporting coal is a recently devel-
oped mechanical device. We believe that it can qualify as
a 'structure' or 'appliance' constituting part of an electric
plant, provided its necessity is established." 67
The court determined this necessity from the fact that the
plant was required to be on a river where the water supply was
abundant; that an economical source of coal was imperative, since
cost of coal is 65 per cent of the cost of production, that the cost
of coal would directly affect the rates charged the public for cur-
rent; and that it was impractical to obtain coal by trucking or by
railroad.
In recognizing the propriety of placing a reasonable construc-
tion upon statutes authorizing condemnation, the court said:
"This is particularly true when public utilities face prac-
tical problems which are the result of mechanical and
scientific progress. '68
And further,
"this court is entitled to and should construe the evidence
in the light of certain important well known facts such as
the chaotic condition of the coal industry... 69
"Even though Section 9192-1, General Code, does not spe-
cifically mention belt conveyor, the evidence... justifies
the conclusion that this belt conveyor is a 'structure' or
'appliance' which is here necessary in the generating of
electricity and is so closely associated with other necessary
elements as to become in effect a part of this 'electric
plant'." 70
Since ORio REv. CODE §1723.01 is practically identical in struc-
ture as Onmo GEN. CODE §9192-1 (now Oiuo REv. CODE §4933.15)
the same arguments should apply to condemnation for underground
storage as applied to condemnation for a belt conveyor. In the light
of the decision in The Ohio Power Co. v. Deist it can be argued
quite forcefully that an underground storage reservoir, which
furthers the essential purpose for which gas suppliers exist- that
of adequately serving the public- is within the "facilities neces-
sary to the purposes of such companies,... organized for the...
storing, transporting, or transmitting... natural or artificial gas."' 71
That the necessity need not be that the very existence of the cor-
67 The Ohio Power Co. v. Deist, supra, note 64 at p. 478.
68 The Ohio Power Co. v. Deist, supra, note 64, at p. 481.
69 See Oury v. Goodwin, 26 Pac. 376 (Ariz. 1891).
70 The Ohio Power Co. v. Deist, supra, note 64 at p. 482.
71 Oino REV. CODE §1723.01.
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poration depends on the appropriation is conceded.72 Nor would
the fact that underground storage is novel make it less a public
use.
73
The phrase to "appropriate so much of such land, or any right
or interest therein, as is deemed necessary for the... building of
such ... reservoirs.. .-174 may be interpreted to include an under-
ground storage reservoir even though the surrounding words of
the statute indicate that the legislature was dealing with water
companies. The condemnation power for gas storage is contained
in the existing statutes. Such an interpretation by the courts would
not be within that haunting term, judicial legislation.
It should be kept in mind, however, that in 90 per cent of the
dealings, arrangements for storage rights are completed in an ami-
cable manner. But because 100 per cent acquiescence of the land-
owners is absolutely essential, the companies need the condemna-
tion power when forced to use it by an unapproachable landowner.
Without sufficient underground storage facilities, the gas consumer
and not the utility will suffer.
Wilbur L. Collins
72 Giesy v. Cincinnati, Wilmington and Zanesville Railroad Co., 4 Ohio
St. 308 (1854).
73 Knoxville Housing Authority v. Knoxville, 174 Tenn. 76, 123 S.W. 2d
1085 (1939).
74 OiH'o REv. CODE §1723.01.
